Format:
Export:

Test cases(24 of 50)

Show
Priority
Category
0/24 completed0%

Complete prerequisites first ([PRE-01](PRE-01) → [PRE-08](PRE-08) minimum) before running these tests. Go to prerequisites

Verify golden image import and PVC clone
Create and boot first VM from template (RHEL 9)

Masquerade uses OVN-K over eno2/br-ex — no bridge setup required

VM live migration (SNO: expected failure)

NOT POSSIBLE on SNO — live migration requires ≥2 nodes. Documented as an expected failure.

Create VM snapshots and perform restore

Test on local storage

Clone VM and use as template (Golden VM pattern)
Pod network (masquerade) and VM access via Service

Optimal for single-NIC — OVN-K over eno2/br-ex, no bridge setup required

VM directly reachable on LAN (OVN-K localnet) -- ⚠ HETZNER TOS VIOLATION

✗ NOT TESTABLE ON HETZNER -- TOS violation! OVN-K localnet works technically (verified 30.06.2026: ping successful), but any VM MAC that reaches eno2/the physical switch via this interface is detected and reported by Hetzner as an unauthorised MAC (server suspension threatened). Only the registered server MAC is permitted.

🚫 Not runnable in this environment

This test works technically and has been demonstrated (NNCP Available, ping from external successful). HOWEVER: Hetzner, where my test cluster is running, sent a violation warning by email quite quickly after the test was started because the VM's own MAC address reached the physical switch via eno2. Hetzner permits only the registered server MAC.

CONCLUSION: direct physical LAN access with the VM's own MAC (OVN-K localnet/bridge binding) is NOT permitted on Hetzner bare metal without ordering an additional MAC or with a dedicated second NIC.

# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# ⚠ HETZNER ToS VIOLATION -- DO NOT RUN ON HETZNER
# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# IMMEDIATE MEASURE (already performed on 30.06.2026)
# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# 1. IP removed from affected interface in the VM:
#    sudo ip addr del 95.216.44.55/26 dev enp2s0
#    sudo ip link set enp2s0 down
#
# 2. VM fully stopped:
virtctl stop vm-lan-test -n vmtest

# 3. VM deleted (do not reuse with an active localnet interface!):
oc delete vm vm-lan-test -n vmtest --ignore-not-found

# 4. Clean up NAD and NNCP -- no one should accidentally attach
#    a VM to them again:
oc delete networkattachmentdefinition lan-localnet -n vmtest --ignore-not-found
oc delete nncp br-ex-localnet-mapping --ignore-not-found

# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MAC AUDIT -- check all cluster VMs for further disallowed MACs
# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# List all VMI interfaces with name, binding type, and MAC:
oc get vmi -A -o json | python3 -c "
import json, sys
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for item in data['items']:
    ns = item['metadata']['namespace']
    name = item['metadata']['name']
    spec_ifaces = item['spec']['domain']['devices'].get('interfaces', [])
    status_ifaces = item.get('status', {}).get('interfaces', [])
    for si in spec_ifaces:
        binding = 'masquerade' if 'masquerade' in si else ('bridge' if 'bridge' in si else 'other')
        mac = next((s['mac'] for s in status_ifaces if s['name'] == si['name']), 'unknown')
        flag = 'RISK -- MAC leaves server!' if binding != 'masquerade' else 'OK (NAT, MAC stays internal)'
        print(f'{ns}/{name}: {si["name"]} [{binding}] MAC={mac}  {flag}')
"

# Alternative without Python (grep-based):
oc get vmi -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"/"}{.metadata.name}{":
"}{range .status.interfaces[*]}{"  "}{.name}{" -> "}{.mac}{" ("}{.interfaceName}{")
"}{end}{end}'

# Expected result after cleanup: ONLY masquerade interfaces (RISK flag should
# no longer appear anywhere). test-vm-rhel9 with masquerade is uncritical.

# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# WHAT CAN BE TESTED INSTEAD (without ToS violation)
# ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# - TC-NET-001 (masquerade + Service/NodePort/LoadBalancer) -- uncritical,
#   MAC stays behind NAT; Hetzner sees only the single server MAC
# - TC-MLB-001/002 (MetalLB) -- likewise via service layer; no
#   separate VM MAC on the wire
# - For a "real" L2 network test: separate lab environment with its own
#   switch (variant B from PRE-02/03) or ask Hetzner explicitly about
#   additional MAC options (fee-based, not available on all products)
SR-IOV – high-performance networking (HW missing)

✗ NOT TESTABLE — SR-IOV requires a dedicated second NIC (Intel X710, Mellanox ConnectX). The sole NIC eno2 is consumed by OVN-K and cannot be used for SR-IOV VFs.

Test VLAN isolation — VMs in separate software bridges

Variant A uses pure software bridges br-net1/2/3 (port: []) — no VM MAC leaves eno2/the physical switch, no TOS risk. Variant B (on-premises, trunk port) is relevant only with your own switch.

Inter-VLAN routing via router VM (br-net1 ↔ br-net2)

purely internal software bridges br-net1/br-net2 (port: []) — no VM MAC leaves the node

VM with 3 Network Interfaces (Management + Data + Storage)
OVN-Kubernetes UserDefinedNetwork (Layer2 Overlay)

UserDefinedNetwork with Layer2 topology is a pure overlay (encapsulated Geneve tunnel within OVN-K) — explicitly NOT localnet, so no VM MAC leaves the node.

⚠️ DEDICATED NAMESPACE REQUIRED: see NOTE below.

Verify MetalLB Basic Functionality

2 Pools: internal-pool binds to br-net1 — external-pool binds to eno2, requires a 2nd public IP

Expose VM Services via MetalLB (SSH)

external-pool uses a provider-registered additional IP (e.g. Hetzner Additional IP); MetalLB speaker announces with the node's own MAC.

⚠️ SHARED RESOURCE: external-pool currently has only ONE IP — Clean up after this test (delete vm-ssh-lb) before starting TC-HCP-002

MetalLB BGP Mode with Router Peering

⚠️ NOT usable by default on the current SNO cluster: there is no customer-controlled router in the path for peering. Left for documentation purposes and future tests.

Multiple IP Pools and Namespace Isolation
MetalLB + Isolated Software Bridges: LB IPs per Bridge Interface

L2Advertisement explicitly binds to br-net1/br-net2 — ARP announcements stay node-internal.

Verify HyperShift Operator and MCE

Single-NIC OK — HyperShift pods use the OVN-K pod network.

⚠️ Check Pod/Node Capacity before starting TC-HCP-002 — see steps below.

Create Hosted Cluster with KubeVirt provider

⚠️ SNO EXAMPLE INSTALLATION: --control-plane-availability-policy SingleReplica is mandatory on a single-node cluster.

Scale NodePool and change VM flavour

⚠️ Be sure enough compute resources are available on the SNO node before starting this test.

Remove Hosted Cluster cleanly (destroy)
DataVolume import from multiple sources

Import over OVN-K — bandwidth is shared with OCP traffic on eno2/br-ex in this cluster

Create VM backup with OADP
Restore VM from OADP backup

Search test plan

Type at least 2 characters to search

Keyboard shortcuts

P
Go to prerequisites
T
Go to test cases
G
Go to glossary
D
Go to diagrams
J
Next card
K
Previous card
Enter
Open / close focused card
/
Open search
CtrlK
Open search modal
?
Show shortcuts
Esc
Close panel / blur search
/ open searchJ/K next / previous card? keyboard shortcutsEsc close panels